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A wiser course than judicial legislation, I submit, is simply to adopt a literal,
reasonable construction of the text that Congress drafted.'
One of the striking features of the criminal law is the accelerating
"federalization" of prosecutions. The federal code has over 3,000 pro-
visions that permit the United States to pursue criminal charges,2 and
these statutes in large measure duplicate crimes that the states can
prosecute. 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist has warned that the burgeoning
federal criminal caseload may soon overwhelm the federal judicial sys-
tem.4 Yet, the Supreme Court's overall docket is shrinking, even with
the crush of criminal prosecutions purportedly overwhelming the
lower federal courts. In the 1994 Term, the Court heard 40% fewer
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I would like to thank Karen
L. McDonald,J. Elvis Candelmo, and Professors Edward M. Wise, John F. Dolan, and Sara
Sun Beale for their kind assistance on a project undertaken with (somewhat) short notice.
1 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2367 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the ProperLimits
forFederal CriminalJurisdiction, 46 HASINGS LJ. 979, 980 & n.10 (1995) (estimating that
after the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat 1796, "there are now more than 3,000 federal crimes.") [hereinafter New
Principles].
3 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Ciminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law,
46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135, 1162 (1995) ("Many federal criminal statutes overlap with or merely
duplicate state law prohibitions unrelated to any substantial federal interest.").
4 See Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Judiciaty 4-5, reprinted in
THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1994, at 1, 3; see also
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, in THE FEDERAL
ROLE IN CRIMINAL LAw: THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLrrICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 39, 45 (Jan. 1996) (between 1980 and 1992, federal criminal cases increased from
27,968 to 47,472, a 70% change) [hereinafter Federalizing Crime].
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cases than it had a decade earlier.5
As the Supreme Court's docket decreases and the number of
criminal prosecutions increases, it is natural that the Court should
devote greater attention to the federal law of crimes. In the 1994
Term, the Court considered six cases involving the construction of
federal criminal statutes, including two unrelated cases that involved
the same provision. 6 The most widely noticed case of the Term was
United States v. Lopez,7 a criminal prosecution in which the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act.8
Despite being the most widely noted case this term, Lopez is likely to
have the least impact of the six on federal criminal prosecutions. Lo-
pez's conclusion that the statute at issue was not a valid exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause drew widespread at-
tention because it marked the first time the Court overturned a provi-
sion on Commerce Clause grounds in almost sixty years.9 Despite the
5 Ernest Gellhorn, Supreme Court Docket Skirts Critical Issues, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 5, 1994, at
A21 (Court began 1995 Term "with the lowest number of scheduled arguments in decades,
after deciding 40% fewer cases last year than it did in 1984."). The increase in the caseload
of lower courts can be traced, at least in part, to the expanding number of appeals related
to sentencing issues under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Beale, New Principles,
supra note 2, at 987 (changes in federal sentencing procedures "have a substantial effect on
the workload of the courts of appeals since criminal appeals now account for approxi-
mately one-fourth of the appellate caseload.").
6 United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995) (18 U.S.C. § 1503 (influencing or
injuring officer or jury generally); 18 U.S.C. § 2232 (c) (destruction or removal of property
to prevent seizure - notice of certain electronic surveillance)); United States v. Gaudin,
115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995) (18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements)); Hubbard v. United States,
115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (18 U.S.C. § 1001); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
(18 U.S.C. § 922(q), (Gun Free School Zones Act)); United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (18 U.S.C. § 2252 (distribution of child pornography); United
States v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994) (21 U.S.C. § 846 (drug conspiracy)). Another
opinion involving a federal prosecution was United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732
(1995) (per curiam), in which the Court overturned a lower court decision finding that
the government had not proven the required interstate commerce element under RICO
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.). That decision did not consider the terms of the statute, but
only whether the government had proven the interstate commerce element.
7 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The Court's announcement of Lopez was the subject of front-
page reporting in newspapers across the country, demonstrating a broader impact on the
general public's perception than most decisions. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenberg, Court
Moves to Rein in Federal Contro CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1995, at 1; Eric Hanson, Court Rejects Gun
Ban Near Schools, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al; James M. Broder, Supreme
Court Rejects Federal School Gun Ban, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al. In legal academic
circles, the Michigan Law Review and Texas Law Review published extensive analyses of the
decision less than a year after the Court issued the opinion. See Symposium, Reflections on
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 533 (1995), Symposium, 74 TEx. L. REv. 695 (1996).
8 18 U.S.C. Section 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 Supp. V).
9 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States."). The last time the Court overturned a statute for falling outside the Com-
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broad constitutional ramifications that the decision may have in other
areas, the effect of Lopez on federal criminal law is likely to be mini-
mal. 10 The Court noted that Congress failed to include a jurisdic-
tional element that might have saved the statute," a mistake Congress
is unlikely to make again, at least for criminal statutes.' 2
More likely to have an impact on federal prosecutions are the
Court's statutory interpretation pronouncements in the 1994 Term.
Indeed, the Court's opinions construing criminal provisions have oc-
casionally included an explicit message to Congress that it must re-
write a provision to achieve a particular result.'3 The 1994 Term
showed the Court grappling with the demands of a growing body of
law fueled by the increasing federalization of criminal law. The
Court's consideration of a variety of federal criminal provisions re-
flects a continuing struggle to adopt a consistent approach to review-
ing criminal provisions that both respects Congress's power to enact
criminal laws and avoids judicial second-guessing as to what the legis-
lature should have written.
merce Clause was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Professor Regan notes
that "Lopez is an occasion to pause and take stock. The Court caught the nation's atten-
tion-and presumably Congress' ...." Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal
Commerce Power and Incidentally Reurite United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH L. RE%,. 554 (1995).
10 The lower courts have upheld convictions after Lopez for violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o) (1994), which makes it "unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine
gun," as a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce, although the provision does
not require proof of an effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d
791, 796 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995).
11 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. See United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 974 (8th Cir.
1996) (upholding prosecution for arson, which requires proof of interstate commerce ele-
ment, because the "Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to
prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.");
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 697 (1995) ("It is unclear whether
a jurisdictional element alone or a jurisdictional element combined with more explicit
congressional findings will resurrect the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones
Act. There is no doubt, however, that omission of ajurisdictional elementwas an impor-
tant factor in the statute's demise.").
12 Lopez may be an effort to send a message to Congress that the expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction should be a considered response to important social problems rather
than a knee-jerk political reaction to the latest media horror story. Professor Brickey notes
that Congress enacted a carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993), in response to
a particularly egregious incident in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. that gar-
nered significant attention on Capitol Hill. Brickey, supra note 3, at 1162 n.154.
13 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 662 (1994) (interpreting the currency
structuring statute's wilfulness element narrowly and noting that "[h]ad Congress wished
to dispense with the requirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction.");
id. at 670 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting) ("Now Congress must try again to fill a hole it rightly
felt it had filled before."); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (interpreting
the mall fraud statute narrowly and noting that "[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must
speak more clearly than it has.").
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In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,14 the Court stretched the
limits of statutory interpretation to reach a decision that ignored both
legislative history and the rules of grammar in applying the intent ele-
ment of the child pornography statute to one of the attendant circum-
stances of the crime. The Court obfuscated the legislative history and
resorted to linguistic subterfuge to rewrite the provision the way the
Court believed it should have been written. Although the Court
treated the child pornography statute as similar to any other criminal
provision, it ignored the important free speech concerns that made
the government's attempt to regulate an area that may involve pro-
tected speech subject to closer scrutiny.
By approaching the question as merely an exercise in statutory
construction that was not controlled by the overriding constitutional
concerns, X-Citement Video signals to lower courts that they may disre-
gard or stretch the language of statutes to reach desired results. A
consequence of treating the statutory language as something to be
ignored may be greater imprecision by the legislature, since the courts
will not respect the language anyway, and inconsistent results among
different circuit courts and between states. Regardless of the Court's
opposition to federalizing certain crimes traditionally handled exclu-
sively at the state and local level, the nature of the legislative process
should not determine whether a statute receives more-or less-re-
spect from the courts.
While the statutory interpretation in X-Citement Video is open to
question, the Court also responded to the increased federalization of
criminal law by addressing some of its own interpretive shortcomings
in overruling two long-standing but ill-considered precedents. In Hub-
bard v. United States,'5 the Court restricted the scope of the false state-
ment statute by overturning a prior decision on the meaning of
"department."' 6 In United States v. Gaudin,'7 the Court reconfigured
the scope of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments on what issues must be
submitted to ajury by overruling a 1929 precedent that had long been
considered the final word on the division of power between judge and
jury to determine the materiality of a false statement.' 8
Reversing two precedents in the same term is striking.' 9 More
14 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
15 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
16 United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
17 115 S. Ct 2310 (1995).
18 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
19 In the ten terms from 1984 through 1993, the Court explicitly overruled controlling
precedents in seven cases. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (rejecting
the "same elements" test in double jeopardy cases, overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508 (1990)); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (allowing victim testimony at crimi-
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important, Gaudin may be a sign that the Court will adopt an expan-
sive constitutional approach to determining what the prosection must
prove to a jury in order to secure a conviction, rather than simply
defer to the legislature's definition of the crime. The majority opin-
ion held that "the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require conviction by
a jury on all elements of the crime," an understanding of "the core
meaning of the constitutional guarantees [that] is unambiguous." 2
0
But the scope of this "core meaning" is not entirely apparent. Is the
legislature's power to define a crime constrained by the requirement
that factual issues must be decided only by the jury and not the court?
Moreover, does the Due Process Clause, in combination with the Jury
Trial Right, guarantee a defendant the right to place every factual issue
that relates to proof of the elements of the crime before the jury? If
so, does this constitutional combination then mean that all facts re-
lated to proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
must be decided ultimately by thejury? If the constitutional rights go
that far, then a question arises about the extent to which the trial
judge must pass evidentiary issues to the jury in order that the proper
factfinder render the verdict.
It is questionable whether the Court intended Gaudin to serve as
the harbinger of a radical restructuring of the power of the trial judge.
Yet, the opinion signals a potentially expansive role for the Court in
deciding traditional criminal law issues under the aegis of determin-
ing the scope of a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment lights.
Under Gaudin's reasoning, a court may be required to delineate what
elements a crime must incorporate to protect the defendant's Jury
Trial Right. Such an approach would inject federal courts into the
construction of both statutory and common law crimes in the guise of
deciding the constitutional question of what ajury must decide.
While Lopez garnered the greatest attention, the 1994 Term may
herald the Court's broader involvement in fashioning criminal law at
nal sentencing hearings, overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1988)); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991)
(allowing police to search closed containers in automobiles when they have probable
cause, overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (coerced confessions are subject to harmless-error analysis, overruling
in part Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)); Irwin v. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, 498 U.S. 89,96 (1990) (30-day time period for filing under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) is
subject to "equitable tolling," overruling Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957));
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (jurisdiction of a court-martial does not de-
pend on the "service connection" of the offense charged, overruling O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(rejecting the "traditional government function" test for defining areas of state regulation,
overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
20 Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2318 (1995) (emphasis in original).
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both the state and federal levels. The point is not just the increasing
federalization of criminal law, but possibly its further "constitutional-
ization" as well.
I. X-CTEmEAT VIDEO: A PERIPATETIC "KNOWINGLY"
The individual defendant in X-Citement Video sold to an under-
cover police officer forty-nine video tapes that depicted an underage
performer engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The government in-
dicted the defendant for conspiracy and for violating the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.21 The prosecu-
tion demonstrated at trial that the seller knew that the performer was
a minor at the time the tapes were made. 22 Despite that evidence, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the provision was facially unconstitutional
because it did not require the government to prove the defendant's
knowledge of the performer's age when shipping the visual
depiction.23
The relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1), under which
the government charged the defendant, is:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce
by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct.
Similarly, § 2252 (a) (2) covers any person who "knowingly receives, or
distributes" any visual depiction if it has been transported or shipped
in interstate or foreign commerce. On its face, the statute appears to
impose strict liability with regard to the age of the performer, what is
known as an "attendant circumstance" of the crime,24 if the defendant
knew that the visual depiction was shipped or distributed. A broad
criminal provision that appeared to ignore First Amendment con-
cerns arising from governmental regulation of potentially protected
speech led the Ninth Circuit to consider the facial validity of the provi-
sion's imposition of strict liability.
The critical issue before the Supreme Court was whether the stat-
21 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994).
22 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 466.
23 982 F.2d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 115 S. CL 464 (1994).
24 See JoSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw, § 9.10[D] [3] (2d ed. 1995)
("In order for any offense to occur, certain circumstances-usually called "attendant cir-
cumstances'--must be present when the actor performs the prohibited conduct and/or
causes the prohibited result that constitutes the social harm of the offense.... An attend-
ant circumstance, however, may be an element of an offense.").
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ute's mens rea element of "knowingly" applied to the depiction "of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct"25 orjust to the shipment
or distribution of the items.26 In a seven to two decision reversing the
Ninth Circuit, with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting, the Court
began its analysis by admitting that "[t]he most natural grammatical
reading, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, suggests that the term 'know-
ingly' modifies only the surrounding verbs: transports, ships, receives,
distributes, or reproduces."27' One might assume that would be the
end of the matter under the usual canon of statutory interpretation
that the "plain meaning" of a statute controls. The Court then as-
serted, however, that this apparent reading of the statute did not con-
trol the analysis, for two reasons. First, according to the Court, simply
following the statute's grammatical structure would create "anoma-
lies" in the scope of the statute. Second, the straightforward reading
would conflict with the presumption that "some form of scienter is to
be implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed," thereby avoid-
ing consideration of the constitutional question addressed by the
Ninth Circuit.28 Neither of these arguments, however, is convincing
without reference to the First Amendment concern.
The Court noted that the straightforward reading of the statute
could lead to the conviction of a druggist returning a roll of film, a
new resident of an apartment receiving a package addressed to the
prior resident, or a Federal Express courier delivering a box, if any of
these items contained depictions of a minor engaged in sexually ex-
plicit acts. Yet, these draconian examples assume that the innocent
bystander knows that the package contains a "visual depiction." There
is no doubt that one must know that a visual depiction is involved to
be liable under the statute, so an anomalous defendant, such as the
courier or new apartment resident, could assert a viable defense based
on a lack of the requisite mens rea.
After creating a proverbial "straw man" as ajustification for ignor-
ing the plain meaning, the Court turned its attention to the second
rationale for moving beyond the statutory language to determine its
scope. The Court relied on three cases, Morissette v. United States,
29
Liparota v. United States,30 and Staples v. United States,31 as creating a
"presumption in favor of a scienter requirement [that] should apply
25 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A) (1994).
26 X-Citement Vuteo, 115 S. Ct. at 467.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
30 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
31 114 S. C. 1793 (1994).
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to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise inno-
cent conduct. '3 2 The Court asserted that this principle of statutory
analysis permitted it to ignore the language of the statute because now
the "plain language reading of § 2252 is not so plain."33 The language
never changed, but the Court's reading of its prior precedents allowed
it to reject a clear understanding of the statute's structure in favor of a
principle of judicial authority that allowed the Court to read into the
provision what it believed the legislature should have written.
The problem with the Court's reliance on these cases is that none
of them stand for quite so broad an understanding ofjudicial power
to reconfigure statutes. The Court has never held as a general propo-
sition that proof of mens rea is a constitutional requirement, so it can-
not merely assert that a provision must include proof of intent in
order to convict the defendant.3 4 Moreover, in Morissette and Liparota,
the Court interpreted the statutory mens rea requirement to apply to
the underlying criminal acts in ways consistent with the grammatical
structure of the law, while Staples attached an intent requirement to an
element of the crime on which the statute was silent.3 5 It is one thing
to apply a specific mens rea to each element of the crime when a stat-
ute's language supports that result; it is an entirely different matter to
do so to reach a result contrary to the "most natural grammatical read-
ing."3 6 As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, "Today's opinion con-
verts the rule of interpretation into a rule of law, contradicting the
plain import of what Congress has specifically prescribed regarding
criminal intent."3
7
What the Court never explained was how Congress should have
written the statute to achieve the result that the "most natural gram-
32 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct at 469.
-3 Id. at 468.
34 See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (many statutes that dispense with
a mens rea element "are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called
the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some
social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.").
35 See X-Citement VUieo, 115 S.Ct. at 473 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("There is no way in which
any of these cases, or all of them in combination, can be read to stand for the sweeping
proposition that 'the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each
of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.'"); Jeffrey P.
Kaplan & Georgia M. Green, Grammar and Inferences of Rationality in Interpreting the Child
Pornography Statute, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1223, 1233 (1995) ("the statutory language at issue in
X-Citement Video, unlike that in Morissette and Liparota, does not grammatically allow a read-
ing which applied a mens rea requirement to the key element in the case.").
36 See X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If what the statute says
must be ignored, one would think we might settle at least for what the statute was meant to
say; but alas, we are told, what the statute says prevents this.").
37 Id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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matical reading" suggests.38 X-Citement Video expanded the Court's
power to rewrite statutes through the assertion of the authority to
transpose the mens rea of a crime to apply to any element, not solely on
the ground that this best reflects congressional intent, but that this
properly interprets the statutory language. The Court asserted that
the child pornography provision "is more akin to the common law
offenses against the 'state, person, property, or public morals' . . . that
presume a scienter requirement in the absence of express contrary
intent."39 Once the Court invoked this vague requirement, it appar-
ently shifted the burden to the legislature to justify the language it
adopted through some additional statement, not necessarily in the
statute itself, that "we mean what we say."
One message of X-Citement Video is that a peripatetic intent ele-
ment of a crime can move outside the boundaries of grammar. The
Court reinforced that point when it noted that the legislative history
"is a good deal less clear. . . that Congress intended that the [knowl-
edge] requirement extend also to the age of the performers."40 The
lack of support in the legislative history for a particular reading nor-
mally cuts against reading the statute in contravention of its grammati-
cal structure. X-Citement Video, however, supported its analysis by
classifying the history of the statute as opaque.41
The strongest reason for adopting the expansive view of the in-
tent element is one the Court treated only in a backhanded manner:
"a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of
the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts."42 The vis-
ual depictions involved may be protected by the First Amendment, so
prosecutions under the act must conform not only to the traditional
constitutional criminal requirements, but further avoid the special
problems related to regulation of protected speech. All strict liability
provisions raise serious questions about the fairness of imposing sub-
stantial criminal liability on morally blameless actors. When the con-
duct subject to the statute involves speech that may be protected by
the First Amendment, then there is an even stronger basis to read the
statute in a manner protective of the rights of the potential individual
38 The grammatical structure of the provision separates out the attendant circumstance
of the presence of a minor engaged in a sexually explicit act in the visual depiction from
the intent element of the crime. See Kaplan & Green, supra note 35, at 1234 (the if-clause
of § 2252 (a) is outside the noun clause, and therefore the adverb knowingly does not mod-
ify the subordinate clause containing the element of use of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct).
39 X-Citement VUeo, 115 S. Ct. at 469 (citing Morissette).
40 IR. at 471.
41 Id at 470.




In Smith v. California,43 the Court stated that an obscenity statute
that did not require proof of intent for conviction would violate the
First Amendment.4 The source of the mens rea requirement is not a
moral concern or the result of textual analysis, but the import of an
overriding constitutional protection. Justice Scalia argued in his X-
Citement Video dissent that the statute should be invalidated because "it
establishes a severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to its purposes,
upon fully protected First Amendment activities." 45 Rather than con-
sider the free speech protection as the authority for its expansive read-
ing of the knowledge element, however, the Court asserted that its
interpretation avoided the constitutional issue, citing nonconstitu-
tional reasons for the decision.
46
Relying on the oft-repeated maxim that courts should avoid con-
stitutional questions whenever possible,47 X-Citement Video broadened
the judiciary's power to ignore the language of statutes when neces-
sary to meet perceived threats of overbroad application of a statute
that do not raise, at least explicitly, constitutional concerns. By not
adopting a forthright analysis that acknowledged the substantial con-
stitutional concerns suffusing the child pornography statute, the
Court took an approach that will allow it to ignore plain language
when a provision implicates nonconstitutional issues. Over thirty
years ago, Professor Packer described the Court's confusing approach
to imposing an intent requirement when interpreting a statute: "Mens
rea is an important requirement, but it is not a constitutional require-
ment, except sometimes."48 X-Citement Video's emphasis on avoiding
the constitutional issue simply reflects the fact that Professor Packer's
pithy summation of the Court's inadequate analysis still holds true.
X-Citement Video extended the pattern the Court traced through
Morissette, Liparota, and, most importantly, Staples the statutory lan-
guage chosen by the legislature does not necessarily control the defi-
43 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
44 Id. at 155.
45 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 The Ninth Circuit majority opinion rested its decision on the constitutional issue,
noting that "it comes closer to judicial rewriting of a statute to engraft onto it an element
of the crime than it does to recognize an affirmative defense, of a type that often exists
without being specified in the statute defining the crime." 982 F.2d at 1292. CircuitJudge
Kozinski dissented in part on the ground that proof of recklessness would be sufficient,
and that the provision should be interpreted to incorporate that mens rea requirement as a
constitutional matter, not as a result of statutory interpretation. Id at 1295 & n.6.
47 X-CiteMent Video, 115 S. CL at 472 ("It is therefore incumbent upon us to read the
statute to eliminate those [constitutional] doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress.").
48 Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Cour4 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 107.
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nition of the crime. Staples added an intent requirement that was not
even hinted at in the provision, while X-Citement Video took the rens rea
element and applied it throughout the statute. Limiting strict crimi-
nal liability for potentially innocent conduct is laudable, and perhaps
is an interest worthy of constitutional protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Yet, the approach adopted in X-Citement Video ignores,
rather than builds upon, the substantial constitutional concern arising
from a provision that imposed broad liability for engaging in poten-
tially protected speech.
With the drive in Congress to federalize broader areas of the
criminal law, an opinion that seemingly ignores the language chosen
by the legislature sends a message that the courts can accord minimal
respect to the legislature's ability to formulate criminal statutes. Legis-
lative drafting may become less efficient and even more imprecise
than it already is after X-Citement Video if Congress believes the courts
can mold the definition of the crime outside the strictures of gram-
mar. Congress may respond to judicial tinkering by adopting ever
more expansive criminal statutes to ensure that the remnant left after
judicial review will retain a significant impact, only adding to the fed-
eralization of criminal law.
II. HUBBARD: MISINTERPRETATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
STR.e DEcIsIs
Among the broadest criminal statutes in the federal code is 18
U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits making a false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement, or concealing of any material fact, "in any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
... ."49 The government has used the statute in a wide variety of
circumstances, including prosecutions for a false statement to obtain a
birth certificate submitted for federal benefits50 and for broadcasting
false radio distress signals used by naval aircraft to investigate an emer-
gency.5 1 The provision has been used in high-profile criminal cases
involving nationally known political figures who lied to Congress, such
49 See United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685, 690 (11th Cir. 1988) (false statement stat-
ute "is necessarily couched in very broad terms to encompass the variety of deceptive prac-
tices which ingenious individuals might perpetrate upon an increasingly complex
government" (quoting United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977))). There
are a number of more specific false statement provisions, limited to a specific federal
agency, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1994) (false statement in passport application), or area
subject to pervasive government regulation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994) (false state-
ment to federally insured financial institution); 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (1994) (false statement in
records required by ERISA).
50 See United States v. Montemayor, 712 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1983).
51 See United States v. Blair, 886 F.2d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1989).
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as former Congressman Dan Rostenkowski52 and former National Se-
curity AdvisorJohn Poindexter,5 3 and cases involving lesser luminaries
who briefly gained infamy, such as Deborah Gore Dean, a former spe-
cial assistant to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
54
The government charged all these defendants under § 1001 be-
cause the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bramblet55 inter-
preted the term "department" in the statute to include the legislative
and judicial branches, in addition to the executive branch. Bramblett
himself was a Congressman who lied to the House Disbursing Office
about the compensation of a clerk, and the Court, in upholding his
conviction, stated that "Congress could not have intended to leave
frauds such as this without penalty."
56
Bramblett's broad construction of the statute was not problematic
for prosecutions involving false statement to Congress. Courts be-
came concerned, however, about whether submissions and arguments
made to a court in the course of litigation could be the basis for a later
criminal prosecution. In response to this concern, the lower courts
created the "judicial function" exception to § 1001, on the ground
that "neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended the statute to
include traditional trial tactics within the statutory terms 'conceals or
covers up."' 5 7 Under this analysis, the statute applied to false state-
ments made to the judicial branch when they involved the "adminis-
trative" or "housekeeping" functions of the courts, but not when they
were related to the traditional adversarial role of litigants and their
counsel.58
In Hubbard v. United States,59 the Supreme Court reviewed a deci-
sion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that
rejected application of the judicial function exception in a bankruptcy
case, a decision that conflicted with the position taken by every other
52 See United States v. Rostenkowski, 68 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (dismissing § 1001
counts alleging false statements to House Disbursing Office).
53 See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1021 (1992) (reviewing § 1001 convictions for numerous false statements to Congress re-
garding arms sales to Iran).
54 See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reversing § 1001 convic-
tions after Hubbard based on false testimony to House Committee investigating HUD influ-
ence-peddling),
55 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
56 Id. at 509.
57 Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
58 Id.; see United States v. Mayer, 775 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(submission of false letters to court for use in determining sentence fell within court's
adjudicative function).
59 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
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circuit that had considered the question.60 The government had
charged the defendant with making false statements to the Bank-
ruptcy Court in two unsworn affidavits concerning possession of assets
and relevant records. In upholding the conviction over the defend-
ant's argument that his statements were related to the court's adjudi-
cative role, the Sixth Circuit expressed concern that the judicial
function exception conflicted with Bramblett's exhortation to read
§ 1001 broadly and said that the exception "does not rest on solid
legal ground."61 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ste-
vens, agreed with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning about the compatibility
of the exception with the statutory language: "We think the text of
§ 1001 forecloses any argument that we should simply ratify the body
of cases adopting the judicial function exception." 62 But the Court
then took a different approach to the issue, questioning the applica-
tion of the false statement statute to the judicial branch and asserting
that "the clarity of [§ 1001] justifies a reconsideration of Bramblett."
The Court noted at the outset of its opinion that Bramblett's ex-
pansive definition of "department" conflicted with the "[flar more
common ... use of 'department' to refer to a component of the Exec-
utive Branch."63 The Court then criticized Brambletts analysis of the
legislative history that purportedly supports its broad interpretation of
"department." The Court found that Brambletfs interpretation was
"not completely implausible, [but was]... nevertheless unsound."64
Hubbard rejected precedent because Bramblett did not give sufficient
weight to the statutory definition and common use of "department" in
the federal criminal code. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied
on the primacy of the statutory language as controlling the interpreta-
tion of the scope of the statute: "a historical analysis normally provides
less guidance to a statute's meaning than its final text .... Courts
should not rely on inconclusive statutory history as a basis for refusing
to give effect to the plain language of an Act of Congress, particularly
when the Legislature has specifically defined the controverted
60 16 F.3d 694 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1754. See id. at 1757 n.2 (cataloguing
decisions of other circuit courts of appeals adopting the judicial function exception).
61 16 F.3d at 701 (citing United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992)).
62 Hubbard 115 S. Ct. at 1763.
63 Id at 1757. An important consideration was the definition of a "department" and
"agency" set forth 18 U.S.C. § 6, which provides that a "'department' means one of the
executive departments" and an "'agency' includes any department, independent establish-
ment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any
corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest .. " 18 U.S.C. § 6
(1994).




Hubbard's reliance on the accepted meaning of the statutory
terms is noticeably different from the textual exegesis the Court un-
dertook in X-Citement Video to overcome the grammatical structure
and inconclusive legislative history of the child pornography statute.
Both decisions narrow the application of the statute, Hubbard by limit-
ing what statements can be prosecuted and X-Citement Video by impos-
ing a higher intent element for conviction. X-Citement Video's concern
with Congress's apparent adoption of strict liability, especially when
the underlying conduct could involve protected speech, may explain
why the Court was willing to alter the plain language of the statute.
But, on its own terms, X-Citement Video did not identify its approach to
statutory interpretation as being anything other than a straightforward
analysis of the language and legislative history of the child pornogra-
phy statute. Hubbard's reliance on the clarity of§ 1001 and the incon-
clusiveness of the legislative history stands in stark contrast to X-
Citement Video's willingness to look beyond the statute's language to
protect other values.
The more subtle issue in Hubbard, which split the Court, was how
to address the issue of stare decisis. The rationale stated injustice Ste-
vens' opinion for overturning Bramblett only drew support from two
otherJustices. 66 The plurality argued that the judicial function excep-
tion was the better interpretation of § 1001, and therefore
"[o]verruling Bramblett would preserve the essence of this doctrine
and would, to that extent, promote stability in the law."67 Justice Ste-
vens also concluded that overturning Bramblett would have little effect
on any reliance interest in the Executive Branch because "we doubt
that prosecutors have relied on § 1001 as an important means of de-
terring and punishing litigation-related misconduct."68 The plurality
termed the decision to overrule Bramblett "difficult," but opted to limit
65 Id. at 1759, 1761.
66 Id. at 1756; see id. at 1765 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring); id at 1766
(Rehnquist, CJ., joined by O'Connor and Souter, _U., dissenting).
67 Id at 1764. The plurality asserted that the unanimous adoption of the judicial func-
tion exception by the lower courts meant that it was a "'competing legal doctrin [e]'...
that can lay a legitimate claim to respect as a settled body of law." Id (citation omitted).
Justice Scalia rejected the position that lower court decisions designed to avoid the effects
of a Supreme Court precedent can ever qualify as an "intervening development," and that
Bramblett should be overruled simply on the basis that it was wrongly decided. Id. at 1765-
66 (ScaliaJ., concurring). The dissent went further, arguing that the plurality's approach
"tells courts of appeals that if they build up a body of case law contrary to ours, their case
law will serve as a basis for overruling our precedent. It is difficult to imagine a more topsy-
turvy doctrine than this .... " Id. at 1767 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
68 Id. at 1764.
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"the coverage of § 1001 to the area plainly marked by its text ... "61
The immediate effect of Hubbards narrowing of the scope of fed-
eral prosecutions will be the dismissal of counts in indictments and
the reversal of convictions for false statements to Congress and the
judiciary that are currently on direct appeal. 70 Defendants who have
already been convicted and exhausted their direct appeal can seek to
have their convictions overturned by filing for either a writ of, habeas
corpus, if they are still in custody, or a writ of error coram nobis if they
have completed their sentence. 71 Moreover, Congress will have to de-
cide whether it wants to enact a broad false statements provision that
will criminally sanction those who could have been prosecuted under
Bramblett for lying to Congress. At present, the only basis for prosecut-
ing false statements to the legislative branch are the narrower perjury
and obstruction of justice statutes, which do not reach the variety of
statements that § 1001 encompasses and which define offenses that
are more difficult for the government to prove.72
Hubbard was an easy case, at least insofar as the Court could not
ignore Bramblett's failure to accord the term "department" its proper
meaning, once the Sixth Circuit created the necessary circuit split to
ripen the issue. AsJustice Scalia noted in closing his concurrence, the
time had come to uproot "this weed" in the precedents. 73 The more
difficult question is how many more weeds are scattered among the
Court's decisions interpreting other criminal provisions. Until the
69 Id. at 1765.
70 See United States v. Levine, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38551 at *5. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4,
1995) (reversing § 1001 conviction for false statement to a congressional committee);
United States v. Dulinawka, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34283 at *8 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 1995)
(reversing § 1001 conviction for false statement to a federal magistrate judge); United
States v. Rostenkowski, 68 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (dismissing § 1001 count alleging false
statements to congressional offices for receipt of funds); United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d
640, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reversing § 1001 convictions for false statements to congres-
sional committee); Case Against Ex-Congresman Is Narrowed, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 14, 1996, at 32
(dismissing false statement counts against former Rep. Joseph P. Kolter after Hubbard).
71 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) (writ of habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994) (All Writs
Act); see generally PeterJ. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435, 462-63 (1995) (reviewing efforts of
defendants to vacate convictions after Supreme Court decision narrowed the scope of the
mail fraud statute involving intangible rights).
72 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994) (obstruction of proceed-
ings before Congress). Perjury can only be prosecuted with regard to statements made
under oath, and the obstruction provision requires proof that the declarant acted "cor-
ruptly," which is a higher intent level than that provided for prosecutions under § 1001. In
response to Hubbard, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives proposing to
amend § 1001 by striking "any department or agency" and substituting broad language
covering false statements to any branch of the government. Government Accountability
Act of 1995, H.R. 1678, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). As this issue went to press, the bill
was languishing in committee.
73 Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Sixth Circuit provoked the issue, the Court and Congress were con-
tent to let Bramblett stand, despite numerous chances for the Court to
revisit the coverage of the statute.74 Will the Court use Hubbard's stare
decisis analysis as a means to confront closer cases of statutory con-
struction to determine that a prior precedent establishing the scope
of a criminal provision should be overturned, altering a settled under-
standing of the law? Perhaps one day the Court will even revisit X-
Citement Video to reassess the question of the clarity of the statutory
language and the majority's interpretation of the legislative history.
If Hubbard is a signal that the Court is willing to overturn prece-
dents that have expanded the scope of federal criminal prosecutions,
then other areas prosecuted federally may be in for temporary
destabilization. For example, federal prosecutors routinely use the
Hobbs Act to prosecute corruption involving state and local officials as
extortion "under color of official right."75 Yet, the statute's origins are
completely unrelated to the misuse of public office, and federal prose-
cutors did not begin to use the provision to combat official corruption
until the early 1970s.76 Justice Scalia has raised the question of
whether the Hobbs Act can be interpreted to reach bribery and other
forms of official corruption, given the legislative history of the statute
and the use of the term "extortion." 77
Hubbards analysis of the statutory language is unassailable, but
the jettisoning of a clear, albeit misguided, precedent should make
one pause to wonder whether the Court's treatment of the judicial
function exception was a singular decision or the sign of a willingness
74 See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1021 (1992); United States v. Holmes, 840 F. 2d 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
831 (1988); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1045 (1986).
75 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). The statute defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right" (Emphasis added.)
76 Congress adopted the Hobbs Act in 1946 to expand coverage of the Anti-Racketeer-
ing Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979 (re-codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994)), to include labor-
related activity, in response to the Court's decision in United States v. Teamsters Local 807,
315 U.S. 521 (1942). "Nowhere in the legislative history of either statute is there any indi-
cation of congressional intent to reach corrupt demands for payment by local officials, or
even a discussion of the problem." Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption:
A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. LJ. 1171, 1175 (1977). One of
the earliest cases to apply the Hobbs Act to a public official was United States v. Kenny, 462
F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Kropke v. United States, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
See Peter D. Hardy, Note, The Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Public Corrup-
tion Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 409, 411 (1995).
77 See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 280 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Before we are asked to go further down the road of making reasonable but textually
unapparent distinctions in a federal 'payment for official action' statute... I think it well
to bear in mind that the statute may not exist.").
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to reconfigure the federal criminal law along much narrower lines.
Such an approach may bring the Court into direct conflict with the
legislative imperative to respond to widespread apprehension of grow-
ing lawlessness. The result of that conflict may again lead Congress to
adopt sweeping provisions to overcome the judicial reluctance to up-
hold federalization of ever greater areas of criminal conduct.
III. GAUDImP ARE ALL "ELEMENTS" OF A CRIME "FACTUAL"
IN NATURE?
A. THE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND THE
JURY TRIAL RIGHT
In 1970, the Supreme Court rearticulated in In re Winship78 the
basic precept for proving a criminal violation: "Lest there remain any
doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." 79 Winship applies in state and federal proceedings, and any
failure by the trial court to adhere to the constitutional mandate for
the government's burden of proof is a "structural error" that under-
mines confidence in the outcome of the trial.80
A subtle, but quite important, shift in the constitutional analysis
of the government's burden of proof occurred in Sullivan v. Louisi-
ana,8' a habeas corpus case challenging a faulty jury instruction that
improperly defined "reasonable doubt." The Court previously had
held the charge used in Sullivan unconstitutional under the Due Pro-
cess Clause in Cage v. Louisiana.8 2 The issue in Sullivan was whether
giving the defective instruction was harmless error, permitting an af-
firmance of the conviction. The Court, in a unanimous opinion by
Justice Scalia, began by noting that the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial
78 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
79 Id. at 364.
80 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1993) (denial ofjury verdict beyond
a reasonable doubt "unquestionably qualifies as" error of the structural type).
81 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
82 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). In a later case, Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239
(1994), the Court divided over two state model instructions defining reasonable doubt that
were not significantly different from that disapproved in Cage, yet the Court upheld their
use. See Paul C. Smith, Note, The Process of Reasonable Doubt: A Proposed Instruction in Response
to Victor v. Nebraska, 41 WAYNE L. Rav. 1811, 1827 (1995) ("Given the similarities between
the Nebraska instruction and the Cage instruction, it may be assumed that both are close to




Right88 "includes, of course, as its most important element, the right
to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of
'guilty.'"84 The substance of what the jury must find is "prescribed by
the Due Process Clause,"85 and Winship imposed the burden on the
government to prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. That
analysis lead the Court to a seemingly innocuous conclusion: "It is self-
evident, we think, that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of
a jury verdict are interrelated. '8 6
Justice Scalia's point in Sullivan was that a violation of the Due
Process protection afforded a defendant under Winship necessarily vi-
olated the defendant's Jury Trial Right because the jury, not the
judge, must determine the essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
And this conclusion, in turn, was critical to answering the question of
whether the harmless error standard applied. Under the Supreme
Court's doctrine, defects that are "structural" in nature are not subject
to harmless error analysis because they undermine the reviewing
court's confidence in the reliability of the jury's determination of
guilt.8 7 Violations of the Sixth Amendment often come closer than
due process violations to affecting the integrity of the entire criminal
adjudication. 88
Justice Scalia's linkage in Sullivan of the constitutional protection
of Winship with the Jury Trial Right meant that the Winship violation
was not harmless because it abrogated the defendant's Jury Trial
Right, not solely because of the violation of the Due Process Clause.
After Sullivan, only the jury's determination of the essential facts be-
yond a reasonable doubt is sufficiently trustworthy to allow a reviewing
court to uphold the verdict, even in the face of a constitutional error.
B. GA UDIN AND THE EXPANDING JURY TRIAL RIGHT
In the wake of Sullivan's new, supposedly "self-evident," con-
83 U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed ... ").
84 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 278.
87 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 809-10 (1991) (structural defects in the
criminal trial are not subject to harmless error analysis); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78
(1986) ("Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.., and no criminal punishment may
be regarded as fundamentally fair.").
88 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-310 (among the constitutional errors not subject to
harmless error analysis are Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, self-representation, and to
an impartial judge).
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joining of the two constitutional protections came the Court's analysis
in United States v. Gaudin 9 of the relationship of the judge and jury in
determining the sufficiency of the proof of a crime. The government
charged Gaudin under § 1001 with making false statements to the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in connection with mortgage
loans that would be insured by the FHA. Lower courts had long inter-
preted § 1001 as requiring the government to prove that the false
statements charged under the statute were "material," which means
capable of influencing a decision.9 0 At trial, the judge informed the
jury that materiality was a question of law to be determined by the
court, and "[y] ou are instructed that the statements charged in the
indictment are material statements." 91 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction on the
ground that the jury, not the judge, was responsible for determining
the materiality of the false statements in § 1001 prosecutions. 92 The
Ninth Circuit's decision created a split in the circuits because every
other court that had considered the question found that materiality
was a question of law.98
The Supreme Court reached the constitutional question despite
the fact that the statutory language does not include materiality as an
element of the crime charged in the case. The government conceded
in its brief, however, that it had to prove materiality beyond a reason-
able doubt to convict the defendant. Based on that concession, the
Court decided it could consider the defendant's Sixth Amendment
argument. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
89 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
90 See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (a "material" statement is one
with "'a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of' the
decision making body to which it was addressed"). The language of § 1001 refers to mate-
riality in cases involving a defendant who "falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact," but only the Second Circuit has held that materiality is
not an element of a false statement prosecution. See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d
1285, 1299 (2d Cir. 1991).
91 115 S. Ct. at 2313.
92 United Stqztes v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994). An important concern for the
Ninth Circuit was the questionable materiality of the false statements. The court noted
that a "persuasive factual argument could be made that there was a reasonable doubt as to
whether the particular [false statements) ... would have tended to influence the agency's
decision." M at 950. While the circuit court's focus appears to be on the strength of the
government's evidence, it used the constitutional analysis to avoid reaching the question of
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty, the very high
standard that defendants must show to have their convictions reversed on sufficiency
grounds; most defendants fail to meet that standard.
93 See id at 955 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Every other circuit to -have considered
whether materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a question of fact or a question of law-




that "[w]hether 'materiality' is indeed an element of every offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is not at all obvious from its text."94
The Supreme Court's holding in Sinclair v. United States95 fostered
what had become the prevailing practice of reserving materiality as a
question of law for the trial court. In Sinclair, the Court held that the
judge alone should determine "pertinency" in a prosecution for crimi-
nal contempt of Congress, involving a witness's refusal to answer a
question, because that element is a pure question of law that does
"not depend upon the probative value of evidence."96 Taking the
same approach as it had in Hubbard with respect to its prior precedent
about the meaning of the statutory definition of "department" in
§ 1001, the Court in Gaudin rejected its earlier holding on the court's
role in false statement prosecutions rather than confining the prior
precedent or finding it otherwise distinguishable.9 7
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, resolved the issue of
who should decide materiality through an apparently simple syllo-
gism: "The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to de-
mand that ajury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with
which he is charged; one of the elements in the present case is materi-
ality; respondent therefore had a right to have the jury decide materi-
ality."98 The Court found that the question of materiality was a mixed
question of law and fact, and therefore "the historical and constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of criminal defendants to demand that the
jury decide guilt or innocence on every issue.., includes application
of the law to the facts."99
In response to the govemment's argument that historically the
trial judge determined materiality in perjury prosecutions, the Court
found that there was no consistent tradition reserving that function to
the court, and that such an approach conflicted with the "unambigu-
ous" core meaning of the Due Process and Jury Trial Right by which a
94 Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2320. Section 1001 states in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same
to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry ....
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (Emphasis added). In Gaudin, the government charged the de-
fendant with making a false statement, which does not include the materiality element that
the concealment portion of the provision contains.
95 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
96 Id. at 298.
97 Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2318 ("Other reasoning in Sinclair, not yet repudiated, we repu-
diate now.").
98 Id at 2314.
99 Id. at 2315.
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jury must determine "all elements of the crime." 100 Without Sinclair to
support the judge's role in determining materiality, the Court's syllo-
gism applied to require the jury to determine all elements of the
crime.10'
It is interesting to compare the necessity for rejecting stare decisis
in Hubbard and Gaudin. Bramblett's holding on the meaning of "de-
partment" required lower courts to engage in a strained statutory in-
terpretation in order to apply the law properly, a matter of intellectual
dishonesty the Court refused to condone in Hubbard. Sinclair's appor-
tioning of duties between judge and jury did not suffer because of
statutory interpretation difficulties, but because the precedent con-
flicted with the recent analysis of the interrelationship between the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments first identified in Sullivan. The major
premise of Justice Scalia's syllogism in Gaudin is a restatement of the
Sullivan analysis taken one step further to establish what a jury must
decide in a case. Sinclair stood in the way of an expansive view of the
defendant's combined Due Process and Jury Trial Rights, while Bram-
blett required judges to create an exception that was not present in the
statutory language.
Although the Sinclair Court stated its holding on the role of the
judge in determining an element of the crime in conclusory lan-
guage that historical practice arguably did not support,10 2 the irony is
that Gaudin did not have to reach the constitutional issue. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence, the government's conces-
sion that materiality was an element of the crime allowed the Court to
move to the constitutional argument directly. The statutory language
does not impose a materiality requirement in prosecutions for false
statements, as opposed to those charging concealment of facts.' 0 3
While Hubbard could not avoid confronting Bramblett's -flawed inter-
pretation and maintain consistency in the interpretation of the statu-
tory language, Gaudin leaped at the chance to repudiate Sinclair
without pausing to consider whether that was necessary to decide the
100 Id at 2317-18 (emphasis in original).
101 Id. at 2319. Justice Scalia applied logic to undermine Sinclaiis viability:
The sole prop for Sinclair [is] its reliance upon the unexamined proposition, never
before endorsed by this Court, that materiality in perjury cases (which is analogous to
pertinence in contempt cases) is a question of law for the judge. Butjust as there is
nothing to support Sinclair except that proposition, there is, as we have seen, nothing
to support that proposition except Sinclair. While this perfect circularity has a certain
aesthetic appeal, it has no logic.
Id.
102 But seeJeffrey Saks, Note, United States v. Gaudin: A Decision With Material Impact 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1157, 1171 (1995) ("Contrary to justice Scalia's opinion, however, a great
deal of historical uniformity supports the view that the practice was settled.").




C. LIFE AFTER GAUDIA. PLAIN ERROR AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Although the Court found that failure to instruct the jury to de-
termine the statement's materiality meant there was no true jury ver-
dict, lower courts have had trouble determining whether a Gaudin
error should result in reversing a conviction when the defendant
never objected to reserving the materiality issue to the court. Under
the Supreme Court's analysis of plain error in United States v. Olano,105
before a reviewing court can overturn a conviction, a defendant who
did not object at trial must show that the error was "clear and obvious"
and that it affected substantial rights; even then, the reviewing court
retains discretion to decide whether to reverse.106 While ajudge's fail-
ure to instruct the jury on its duty to find materiality is clear and obvi-
ous error after Gaudin, lower courts have split on whether to exercise
the discretion to reverse granted them in Olano.
Some courts have held that when the defendant did not dispute
the materiality of the statements at trial, or when proof of materiality
was strong, then upholding the conviction did not result in any mis-
carriage ofjustice. 107 Other courts have taken a categorical approach,
104 The Court has granted certiorari, at the government's request, to answer the ques-
tion of whether materiality is an element of the offense of making a false statement to a
financial institution under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, when the statutory language does not require
proof of materiality. See United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d. 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996) ("we explicitly adopt the rule we have implicitly acknowl-
edged before, that the 'materiality' of a false statement is an element of proving a violation
of § 1014."). The issue in Wells is one of statutory interpretation, calling for the Court to
determine whether Congress intended to make any false statement to a financial institu-
tion punishable.
While lower courts have generally required that the government prove the materiality
of the statements, the rationale for reading that element into the statute is not clear. Some
courts impose the materiality element based on concerns about prosecutorial discretion,
that there be reasonable limits on the government's power to prosecute under the statute,
see, e.g., United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1975) ("When dealing with a
pervasive, all-encompassing statute, however, the courts must be extremely careful to in-
sure that reasonable limits are observed."); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 & n.2
(6th Cir. 1983) (materiality element imposed for § 1001 prosecution because "we view the
materiality requirement as ajudicially-imposed limitation to insure the reasonable applica-
tion of the statute."), while others found that Congress intended to require proof of mate-
riality despite silence in the statutory language. See, e.g., Wells, 63 F.3d at 751 ("Because the
statute requires proof of the materiality of a false statement, materiality is an element of
§ 1014.").
105 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993).
106 Id. at 1777-78.
107 See United States v. Randazzo, 80 F.3d 623, 632 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Although
Randazzo's brief struggles imaginatively to find a doubt [about materiality] based on the
amount of the misreported expenses in comparison with corporate income, the amount
(between $45,000 and $60,000 each year) was not trivial or immaterial, even assuming
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following the analysis of harmless error charted by the Supreme
Court in Sullivan. After Gaudin, the jury must decide all mixed ques-
tions of law and fact, so these courts held that any violation of the
defendant's Jury Trial Right required reversal because there was no
jury verdict on one of the elements.108 The Supreme Court's reliance
on Sullivan in Gaudin, which took a strict approach to errors involving
Winship issues, raises the question of whether any usurpation of the
dubitante that amount matters in the case of a deliberate falsification."); United States v.
McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 1405 (5th Cir. 1996) (exercising discretion to reverse conviction
when "the record presents a serious factual question regarding the materiality of Mc-
Guire's statements."); United States v. Jobe, 77 F.3d 1461, 1476 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The evi-
dence against him was overwhelming. Billie Mac has not challenged its sufficiency on
appeal. Denying him the formality of a new trial does not effect a fundamental miscarriage
ofjustice."); United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Here, the govern-
ment presented evidence sufficient to convince any rational factfinder that the defendants'
false statements were material. In fact, the issue of materiality was not even significantly
disputed by the defendants at trial."); United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1368 (5th Cir.
1996) ("In each case, the evidence of materiality was overwhelming."); United States v.
Nash, 76 F.3d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1996) (We therefore have the discretion to correct the
error.., and feel compelled to exercise that discretion."); United States v. Howard, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 3711 at *6 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) ("At trial, Howard did not present any
arguable factual question regarding the materiality of his false statements .... Thus the
Gaudin error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of How-
ard's proceeding."); United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
error did nothing to change the outcome of the case because under a correct application
of the law, the verdict would have been guilty regardless."); United States v. Kramer, 73
F.3d 1067, 1075 (11th Cir. 1996) ("He does not assert he was truly harmed, we presume,
because a review of the record shows conclusively that the district court properly deter-
mined-and we are unconvinced that a reasonable juror could have found otherwise-
that Gilbert's lies, had the capability of influencing the 1990 jury."); United States v. Keys,
67 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Because there was no serious factual question regarding
the element on which the court, on defendant's invitation, did not instruct, the error
could not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.").
108 See United States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d. 732, 737 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[W]here ajury has not
rendered a verdict that addresses every essential element of the charged offense, and
therefore has not rendered a verdict on the crime charged, the question of whether the
same verdict would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is meaningless.");
United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d. 1500, 1511 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The reasoning of Sullivan
leads inescapably to the same conclusion in the present case. Because the element of
materiality was withheld from the jury, the jury rendered no verdict as to that particular
element of the offense. Thus, the harmless error analysis is similarly inapplicable.");
United States v.Johnson, 71 F.3d. 139, 144 (4th Cir. 1995) ("To hold otherwise would be
to engage in the type of speculation and hypothesizing censured by the Supreme Court in
Sullivan. In sum, we hold harmless error review of the error presented in the case before
us is unavailable."); United States v. Pearson, 897 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (C.D. Ill. 1995)
("[T] he Government apparentiy ignores the fact that the United States Constitution grants
the accused the right to have ajury render the requisite finding of guilt. How 'clear-cut'
the materiality issue was is irrelevant!"). It seems that different understandings of the
scope of Gaudin can occur in the same circuit, as witnessed by the Fifth Circuit's contrast-




jury's factfinding function can ever allow the conviction to withstand
challenge.
Gaudin's use of Sullivan as the principal precedent for requiring
juries to decide mixed questions of law and fact may have far-reaching
implications. By expanding the jury's power to decide issues, Gaudin
will have an unsettling effect on convictions for violating other false
statement statutes. As an initial matter, the courts must resolve the
question of whether materiality is an element of the crime. Circuit
Judge Kozinski pointed out in dissenting from the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Gaudin that there are fifty-four federal statutes in which
lower courts impose proof of materiality on the government even
though the statutory language does not include that element.1 °9
Among the most important provisions with an imputed materiality ele-
ment are those covering false statements made (1) to financial institu-
tions;110 (2) in immigration and naturalization matters;I1I and, (3) for
claims to obtain benefits or payments from the government.' 12
Gaudin's effect is unclear on the interpretation of other provi-
sions that reserve to the judge the decision on an element of the
crime. In United States v. Amparo,113 the Ninth Circuit held that the
determination of what constitutes a "crime of violence" is a question
of law reserved to the court to decide. The provision in question re-
quired an enhanced sentence for any defendant who uses a firearm
"in relation to any crime of violence," which the statute defines as a
crime having "as an element the use... of physical force . . . or...
that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force ... may
be used in the course of committing the offense." 114 The appellate
court rejected the application of Gaudin because "whether possession
of a sawed-off shotgun is a crime of violence is a matter of law once
the jury has determined the factual predicate that the defendant pos-
sessed an unregistered sawed-off shotgun."115 Similarly, the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Klausner, 16 held that the materiality of state-
ments in a prosecution for filing false or fraudulent tax returns "was
purely a legal question" because the "false itemized deductions neces-
sarily resulted in inaccurate amounts of taxes reported... [and] inevi-
109 28 F.3d at 959-60 & n.4 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski noted that there
are 43 federal false statement statutes with express materiality requirements. Id. at 959 n.3.
110 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994).
111 18 U.S.C. §§ 1015, 1546 (1994).
112 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 408 & 1761(o) (1994).
113 68 F.Sd 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1995).
114 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (1994).
115 Amparo, 68 F.3d at 1226.
116 80 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
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tably made the returns false as to a material matter.""17
Unless the question addressed in Gaudin can be separated from
the effect of the Jury Trial Right on statutory construction, Amparo and
Klausner are not easily reconciled with the Supreme Court's treatment
of the materiality element in a § 1001 prosecution. Gaudin held that
determining materiality requires "delicate assessments of the infer-
ences a 'reasonable [decisionmaker]' would draw from a given set of
facts .... "118 What is not clear from Gaudin is whether an element of
the crime that does not require "delicate assessments," but only mun-
dane factual conclusions, can be reserved for decision by the court
and not the jury, even if it is technically an element of the offense.
The underlying question not answered in Gaudin is why materiality in
a § 1001 prosecution was sufficiently important to require the jury to
decide the issue, especially when the statutory language does not
make materiality an element of the offense.
If Gaudin's constitutional footings depend on the government's
concession that materiality was an element of the statute, then its ef-
fect could be limited to those elements that.a court determines must
be decided by ajury. Other provisions that incorporate legal terms or
elements with little factual content may be susceptible to the type of
analysis adopted in Amparo and Klausner But Gaudin may impose a
broader requirement: only the jury may decide whether there is suffi-
cient proof when the element requires resolution of any factual issue,
no matter how innocuous in relation to the question of guilt or inno-
cence. If the latter proposition is the correct reading of Gaudin, then
the Second and Ninth Circuits are surely wrong to hold that the judge
and not the jury should decide whether an act was a "crime of vio-
lence" or a statement on a tax return was "material" because each de-
cision may entail a "delicate assessment" of the facts.
The statutory interpretation question can then lead to the consti-
tutional issue of whether an element of a crime can ever be decided
solely by the court as a matter of law, especially if it requires any fac-
tual determination. Gaudin will lurk in the background of every statu-
tory interpretation case when the trial judge plays a role in deciding
the existence of that element.
D. THE ROLE OF COURTS AND LEGISLATURES AFTER GAM'YDIN
The question of what constitutes an "element" of an offense takes
117 Id. at 61; see id. at 63 (Van Graafeiland,J., dissenting in part) ("I am constrained by
the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Gaudin to dissent from the affirmance of
Klausner's conviction" on the tax charges).
118 United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314 (1995).
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on greater importance after Gaudin. Once the legislature designates
proof of a particular fact as an element of the offense, under the
Court's analysis of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, the jury must de-
cide the existence of that conduct. At this point, the broad major
premise ofJustice Scalia's syllogism in Gaudin takes on greater signifi-
cance, and it is helpful to recall it: "The Constitution gives a criminal
defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the
elements of the crime with which he is charged . ... "119 The Court
based that premise on Winship, which required the government prove
all "facts" beyond a reasonable doubt.
In analyzing a statute in light of Gaudin, courts could interpret
the constitutional rule to mean that all issues involving a factual deter-
mination are a component of the "elements" of a crime, and must be
decided solely by the jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Understood in this manner, Gaudin injects a constitutional question
into statutory construction by requiring courts to ascertain the factual
components of the crime to ensure that only the jury, and not the
judge, decides those elements. This constitutional aspect of statutory
interpretation arises from the coupling of Winship's Due Process pro-
tection with the expansive Jury Trial Right recognized in Sullivan.
Equating proof of "facts" under Winship with the determination
of the "elements" of the crime in Gaudin raises two interesting ques-
tions: first, does Gaudin constrain the legislature's power to define the
elements of a crime; and, second, does the decision restrict the trial
court's power to make factual determinations that may affect the
jury's consideration of the elements.
1. Can the Legislature Define Elements of a Crime as Questions of Law?
Although the Supreme Court proclaimed the Winship standard as
a categorical protection, doubt remained as to the scope of the Due
Process Clause vis-a-vis the legislature's power to define the elements
of a crime, i.e., the "fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime." In Pat-
terson v. New York, 120 the Court upheld a New York statute that placed
on a defendant, who sought to reduce a second degree murder
charge to manslaughter, the burden of persuasion by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the actions resulted from an extreme mental
or emotional disturbance. If the defendant proved the defense, then
the jury could only find him guilty of the reduced charge of man-
slaughter.121 The Court distinguished Winship in upholding the allo-
119 Id. (emphasis added.)
120 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
121 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1985).
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cation of the burden of persuasion to the defendant: "[T]he Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of
which the defendant is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all af-
firmative defenses has never been constitutionally required .... -122
Although the Court recognized that a statute can impose the bur-
den of proof on defendants with regard to an affirmative defense, it
also noted that there were limits to the legislature's power to define
the prosecution's burden. The Court advised that any "shifting of the
burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so
important that it must be either proved or presumed is impermissible
under the Due Process Clause."' 28 While Patterson identified a theo-
retical limitation on the legislature's prerogative to define a crime as it
saw fit, the Court did not explain what facts were sufficiently impor-
tant so that the Constitution imposed the entire burden of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt on the government.
A decade after Patterson, in Martin v. Ohio,'24 the Court once
again hinted at a limit imposed by the Due Process Clause in uphold-
ing a provision placing on the defendant in a murder prosecution the
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing
was in self-defense. The Court contrasted the statutory scheme in
question from one under which the jury could not even consider the
defense evidence unless the defendant first demonstrated self-defense
by a preponderance. While the Court accepted a statutory scheme
that required the defendant to carry the burden of persuasion, it
noted that an exclusionary rule preventing the defendant from intro-
ducing evidence that would negate an element of the crime "would be
quite different."125
122 Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 at 210. Much of Patterson's analysis refuted an expansive view
of the Court's decision two terms earlier in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), which
overturned on due process grounds a Maine statute that shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant in a murder prosecution to show that he acted in the heat of passion due to a
sudden provocation. The Court stated in a foomote:
There is some language in Mul/aney that has been understood as perhaps construing
the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt any fact affecting "the degree of criminal culpability".... It is said that such a
rule would deprive legislatures of any discretion whatsoever in allocating the burden
of proof, the practical effect of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our
criminal justice system .... The Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far-
reaching effect.
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214 n.15 (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 215.
124 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
125 Id. at 233. The dissent noted that "the Court significantly, and without explanation,
extends the deference granted to state legislatures in this area. Today's decision could be
read to say that virtually all state attempts to shift the burden of proof for affirmative de-
fenses will be upheld, regardless of the relationship between the elements of the defense
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Finally, in a case decided in the 1995 Term, Cooperv. Oklahoma,126
the Court struck down a statute that shifted to a defendant the burden
of proof on the question of competency to stand trial. The Court
found that the defendant's constitutional right to trial and to assist in
his defense were infringed by imposing on him the burden of proving
competence by clear and convincing evidence. 127
Cooper identified a limitation on the legislature's power to shift
the burden of proof when the question involved a "fundamental con-
stitutional right." Yet, neither Cooper nor Martin provide guidance as to
what the Court meant in Patterson when it warned that the Due Pro-
cess Clause limited the legislature's power to exclude or alter the bur-
den of proof with respect to an element of the offense required for a
conviction. 128 Patterson spoke of some vague limit on the legislature's
power to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, but Gaudin may
take that limitation further if all factual determinations adverse to the
defendant must be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Jury Trial Right may prevent the legislature from designating
part of a crime as a question of law to be determined by the court. For
example, if an element of a federal crime involves proof of an effect
on interstate commerce, could Congress after Gaudin reserve that is-
sue for the judge? Whether a transaction implicates interstate com-
merce involves a factual component-did it affect commerce?-so
Gaudin could bar giving exclusive power to resolve the question to the
judge. Prior to Gaudin, there were proposals to reform the federal
criminal law to eliminate the jurisdictional basis for the crime as an
element of the offense. Ifjurisdiction entails resolution of any factual
question, however, then Gaudin should bar that approach. 129
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Gaudin asserted that
"[n]othing in the Court's decision stands as a barrier to legislatures
that wish to define-or that have defined-the elements of their crim-
inal laws in such a way as to remove issues such as materiality from the
jury's consideration." 130 Justice Scalia's majority opinion did not ad-
and the elements of the crime." Id. at 240 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
127 Id. at 1384.
128 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 348, at 597 (4th ed. 1992) ("Can the state create an
affirmative defense simply by carefully excluding it from the elements of the offense? The
answer to this question seems to be a qualified yes.").
129 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS:
A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIME CODE (TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE) (1971). See Saks,
supra note 102, at 1183 ("Regardless of how a legislature labels materiality, it cannot alter
what materiality truly is. Because it necessarily has a factual component, materiality must
be determined by the jury in order to maintain the Fifth and Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Gaudin.").
13o Gaudin, 115 S. CL at 2321 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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dress the legislature's power to alter the role of judge and jury by
amending the definition of a crime, so the ChiefJustice's dictum may
be an attempt to restrain lower court's from reading Gaudin expan-
sively as restricting legislative prerogatives. Yet, the legislature's power
to allocate, or reallocate, resolution of a factual issue to the trial judge
is certainly questionable after Gaudin.
Justice Scalia's opinion noted the "impressive pedigree" of the de-
fendant's right to be tried by ajury, and the jury's crucial role in mak-
ing the "delicate assessments" that lead to the requisite factual
conclusion of guilt or innocence.' 3 ' Regardless of the Chief Justice's
assertion, Gaudin cannot be read to give legislatures a free hand to
designate any factual issue as one reserved exclusively to the trial
judge. Just as Patterson observed that there must be some limit to the
legislature's power to alter the definition of a crime, so too should
Gaudin be understood as creating a barrier that constrains the legisla-
ture's authority to reserve factual issues to the trial judge merely by
labeling them "questions of law."
13 2
2. The Thin Line Between Law and Facts
Gaudin's greatest effect may be on the trial judge's role in making
factual determinations that affect the jury's conclusions about proof
of the elements of the crime. Justice Scalia's opinion noted that the
jury has no role in deciding "pure questions of law in a criminal case
... [and] the judge must be permitted to instruct the jury on the law
and to insist that the jury follow his instructions."' 33 When, however,
a question involves any factual issue, then it must be given to the jury
"not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts
and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence." 134 The cru-
cial issue raised by Gaudin is whether there are facts that affect proof
of an element that the judge can decide, even if that decision could
alter the jury's decision on guilt or innocence.
The trial judge's traditional role of deciding questions concern-
ing the presentation of evidence to the jury is a likely target for
Gaudin's coupling of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In decisions
on evidentiary questions, as Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick point
out, "some fact questions are resolved by judges even injury cases...
the factfinding mission can involve judges in taking testimony, resolv-
'3' Id at 2313, 2314 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 See Saks, supra note 102, at 1190 ("To allow the legislature to label elements as ques-
tions of law for the court will impermissibly bypass the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protec-
tions by linguistic sleight of hand.").
133 Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2315.
134 L at 2316.
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ing conflicts, and assessing credibility."135 Beyond ruling on the ad-
mission of evidence under the applicable rules, the trial judge also
must determine whether a defendant has met the burden of produc-
tion to justify an instruction on an affirmative defense.' 36 The trial
judge can exclude a defense witness from testifying when the defend-
ant failed to identify the witness in time' 37 or to follow notice require-
ments for introducing a defense.138
This list is by no means exhaustive, but each example shows the
judge making factual determinations that will affect the jury's decision
whether the government has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The exclusion of witnesses or evidence based on a defendant's non-
trial conduct, such as barring the introduction of evidence by a de-
fendant as a sanction, could be especially troubling if courts interpret
broadly Gaudin's exhortation that only the jury may decide issues of
fact that are integral to proof of the elements of the crime. If the
defendant's Jury Trial Right includes the right to have the govern-
ment prove all facts relevant to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
then exclusion of such evidence should not be permitted.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued for a narrow interpretation of
Gaudin's holding in his concurrence: "The Court properly acknowl-
edges that other mixed questions of law and fact remain the proper
domain of the trial court .... ,,1 The areas not affected by Gaudin,
according to the ChiefJustice, were the admissibility of evidence, com-
petency of the defendant, voluntariness of confessions, and the legal-
ity of searches. The Court's approach in Gaudin, however, was not to
carve out a special area of jury competence on the materiality ele-
ment, leaving untouched other mixed questions of fact and law. Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion did not address the issues the Chief Justice
asserted were not affected by the Court's analysis of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist's ex ante proclama-
tion of Gaudin's limited effect may signal his concern that the Court's
conjoining of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights will have an im-
pact beyond the jury's exclusive power to decide the statutorily de-
135 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.10, at 36 (1995); see
1 MCCou MICK ON EVIDENCE § 53, at 79 (4th ed. 1992) (on questions of admissibility of
evidence, "Issues of fact are usually left to the jury, but there are strong reasons here for
not doing so. If the special question of fact were submitted to the jury when objection was
made, cumbersome and awkward problems about unanimity would be raised.").
136 See MUELLER & IRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 3.12, at 159 ("If the defendant does
not produce sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to find the facts constituting
the defense, it is not submitted to the jury, and it effectively drops out of the case.").
137 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
138 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
139 United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2321 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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fined elements of the crime.
The Supreme Court could limit Gaudin's broad language by tak-
ing a strict approach to what constitutes an "element" of the offense
and simply assert that evidentiary and trial-management decisions are
"pure questions of law." Such an approach would confine Gaudin to
the rare case in which the trial court interpreted the elements of the
crime to involve a pure question of law. Yet, lower courts would be ill-
advised to take that approach, given Gaudin's expansive analysis re-
quiring jury determination of mixed questions of law and fact. Amparo
and Klausner suggest that courts may not have considered the full im-
plications of Gaudin's application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.
It is hard to read Gaudin as a narrow rule.' 40 Justice Scalia's opin-
ion did not take a circumspect approach to the question of the jury's
role, and the Court chose to decide the constitutional issue by ac-
cepting without hesitation the government's concession that material-
ity was an element of the crime. 41 Moreover, Gaudin did not
distinguish between the jury's role in determining factual questions
and the requirement that criminal convictions "rest upon ajury deter-
mination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."'
42
A broad reading of Gaudin, one restricting the judge's role in
deciding evidentiary issues that affect the jury's factfinding role, may
lead to an odd constitutional arrangement. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Confrontation Clause' 43 quite narrowly, in large part
making its protection coextensive with the rules of evidence. 44 Simi-
140 But see id. at 2320 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("I write separately to point out that
there are issues in this area of the law which, though similar to those decided in the
Court's opinion, are not disposed of by the Court today.")
141 The Court will decide the question of whether materiality is an element of a false
statement offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, covering false statements to financial institu-
tions, when the statutory language does not require proof that the statement was material.
See United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745 (1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996). The
decision in Wells likely will control the analysis for the large number of other federal false
statement provisions with imputed materiality elements.
142 Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2313 (emphasis added).
143 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the wimesses against him . . ").
144 See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal
for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 558 (1992) ("[T]he only function
the Court currently ascribes to the [Confrontation] Clause is the promotion of accuracy in
fact-finding, a goal which is the primary objective of evidentiary rules."); Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Constitutionalitation of Hearsay: The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 MINN. L. RE-,. 521 (1992)
("Although the bulk of hearsay doctrine remains in decisional or statutory form, the doc-
trine also has been 'constitutionalized.'"); Randolph N.Jonakait, Restoing the Confrontation
Clause to the Sixth Amendmen4 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 558 (1988) ("The confrontation clause
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larly, the Court has not taken an expansive approach to a defendant's
right to present evidence under the Compulsory Process Clause. 145
Gaudin, however, could be read to constrain the judge's power to
make evidentiary decisions that exclude the defendant's evidence
from the jury because that ruling might affect the determination of
guilt or innocence. That interpretation would give defendants a pow-
erful weapon to challenge rulings excluding them from presenting
evidence beyond that provided by the other trial-related constitutional
protections. It would be interesting, to say the least, to see a judge's
evidentiary ruling overturned for violating the Jury Trial Right when it
would withstand scrutiny under the Confrontation and Compulsory
Process Clauses.
Conventional wisdom is that "the 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
standard applies to each element of the crime but not to each piece of
evidence offered to prove an element."'146 Gaudin may blur the line
between elements and facts through its combination of the Due Pro-
cess protection established in Winship and the Jury Trial Right, to re-
quire that the jury decide all factual issues. Given the creativity of the
criminal defense bar, one should not be surprised to see Gaudin cited
in circumstances quite unlike those of the original case to challenge
convictions based on the jury's failure to decide all factual issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1994 Term saw the Supreme Court engaging in statutory in-
terpretation in X-Citement Video to avoid a constitutional issue, and ap-
plying the combined Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights in Gaudin to
overturn a conviction on constitutional grounds without considering
the question of whether the statute even required the government to
prove the element of materiality. Hubbard had to deal with a simple
question involving the definition of a term made much more compli-
cated because of the Court's earlier reading that ignored the obvious
meaning of that term.
is no longer a constitutional right protecting the accused, but essentially a minor adjunct
to evidence law.").
145 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) ("The accused does not have an unfet-
tered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible
under standard rules of evidence. The Compulsory Process Clause provides him with an
effective weapon, but it is a weapon that cannot be used irresponsibly."); Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55-56 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("This Court has had little occasion
to discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause .... Our cases establish, at a
minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in com-
pelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury
evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.").
146 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 3.11, at 157-58.
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The federalization of the criminal law is increasing the pressure
on the Court to resolve questions of statutory interpretation. Hubbard
faced the challenge of overturning a clear, if flawed, precedent that
made adherence to the principle of stare decisis intellectually unsup-
portable. X-Citement Video's analysis was questionable because it
cloaked its conclusion in the language of statutory interpretation to
avoid construing the statute in such a way as to impinge on an impor-
tant constitutional protection, freedom of expression. In fact, the
constitutional value could have framed the rule that an intent element
should be read to require a showing of intent to use minors in sexu-
ally explicit depictions: the First Amendment imposes an independent
requirement that the government prove mens rea as an element of the
crime when protected speech may be involved in the violation.
The constitutional aspects of statutory interpretation can come to
the forefront through Gaudin. That decision calls into question con-
victions in cases requiring proof of materiality, an issue decided tradi-
tionally by the judge, not the jury. Courts will have to review a wide
variety of federal statutes that leave important factfinding to the judge
to determine, first, whether Gaudin requires the jury to make the deci-
sion, and, second, whether any error on that issue mandates reversal
of the conviction.
Beyond the direct effect of Gaudin on convictions, the Court's
coupling of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments creates a new vehicle for
defendants to challenge decisions made by the judge that affect the
deliberations of the jury. Moreover, the power of legislatures to de-
fine the elements of a crime may be in for closer review in light of
Gaudin's requirement that only the jury may decide mixed questions
of law and fact. The major premise of Gaudin is not necessarily lim-
ited to proof of the statutory elements of the crime, since Winship
speaks of "facts" and Gaudin addresses the role of the jury as the
factfinder making "delicate assessments." Therein lies a question
about what Gaudin may become: will it be the new vehicle for chal-
lenging the power of the legislature to define a crime and the rulings
of judges that affect the jury's determination of guilt?
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